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Abstract Why do some public organizations survive and others do not? The bureau-
cratic retrenchment efforts since the 1980s showed public administration scholars that
the structure of the state has its own demography. Yet studies on the survival of public
organizations tested different hypotheses using different methods and definitions. This
review article reflects on the consequences of different takes on termination, it com-
pares and reports on the main findings thus far and argues that we should study
organizational survival focusing on transitions to build on existing empirical work.
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Introduction
Are bureaucracies really ‘immortal’ and—once created—do they become more powerful
than the elected politicians that are supposed to control them? By the end of the 1970s,
when welfare states had seemingly reached their limits in Western democracies, these
questions gained prominence in studies of US and European public sectors. Political
leaders such as President Ronald Reagan in the United States and PrimeMinister Margaret
Thatcher in the United Kingdom embarked upon a series of administrative reform trajec-
tories to Bshrink the state^: privatization, deregulation, agencification, liberalization, de-
centralization, and New Public Management all aimed to downsize central government
bureaucracies. However, those same politicians soon found out that changing the structure
and organization of their central governments was a hard nut to crack. Not only did
administrative reforms evoke harsh political opposition, they also increased—if successful
at all—fragmentation and coordination costs (Pollitt 2003; Christensen and Lægreid 2007).
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The politics of public sector reforms coincided with a growing body of literature on
the demography of government. Starting with Herbert Kaufman’s seminal Are Gov-
ernment Organizations Immortal? (1976), scholars on both sides of the Atlantic and
beyond studied the transformation of government—including the survival of public
organizations (Peters and Hogwood 1988, 1991; Lewis 2002, 2004; Carpenter and
Lewis 2004; Adam et al. 2007; Boin et al. 2010, 2016; Rolland and Roness 2011; Park
2013; MacCarthaigh 2014; James et al. 2015).
The conclusions of these studies are clear on one aspect. Public organizations
are far from immortal. Across a diversity of public sector populations under study,
one thing stands out: over time, most public organizations perish or lose their
structural autonomy. The explanations vary. Public sector organizations brutally
compete over limited government resources. They suffer from political turnovers
and executive ambitions of each new incumbent. They risk liabilities of newness,
adolescence and obsolescence. Their institutional design can protect them in the
short run but over time turn into a liability or vice versa.
Also on other aspects of organizational mortality, existing studies disagree. The
explanations for termination and survival of public organizations often ignore the
findings of others both interdisciplinary and within their own discipline. More
disturbingly, disagreement over definitions of organizational termination continues
to feed the debate, and color the findings on survival. As if during an autopsy,
different doctors arrive at different conclusions on the cause of death whereas a
third one claims the patient has not died at all. We think much can be gained from
overview of the debate on public organization survival, to increase the knowledge
on the demography of government and increase our insight into political control
over the organization of the public sector.
The aim of this article is twofold. First, we review existing articles that explain
survival and termination of (public) organizations. We evaluate both hypotheses
and findings from institutionalist theories that use a more ‘biological’ definition of
termination (i.e. ‘death’ of the organization) and from theories of political control
over the public sector that are more interested in a range of transitions of public
organizations. We offer an overview of the findings. Results and findings from
different analyses do not add up, given the use of varying definitions and incom-
patible methodology. But they do give us a set of factors that may matter. This
relates to the second aim of this article, to evaluate the full range of existing survival
explanations and build on previous findings to contribute to theory. Based on our
review of termination definitions, we think different concepts have important
implications for research findings. In the concluding section we propose to get rid
of the ‘termination’ terminology and the biological life and death metaphors and
replace it with a focus on ‘transitions’.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the following section we explain the
design of the literature review. In section three we discuss the differences in conceptu-
alizing termination in the reviewed studies and the implications terminological differ-
ences have for their findings. Section four introduces a model for survival of public
sector organizations based on the reviewed literature and section five discusses the
comparison of findings. We conclude in section six with reflections on the road ahead.
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Design of this Study
To survey what factors influenced survival and termination of public sector organiza-
tions according to scholarly accounts of the past decades, we decided to cast the net
widely and include all possible social science disciplines that could offer us potential
explanations. We decided to focus on scholarly articles and used two systemic search
methods to identify relevant works.
First, we employed the advanced search of the Web of Science database
provided by Thomson Reuters. Within English language articles of their Social
Science index we used a Boolean approach to find key word combinations of
‘organiz*’ and ‘termin*‘or ‘surviv*‘or ‘death’. We refined our initial 2393 results
by excluding articles from the life sciences, biology, engineering, computer
sciences, environmental and geosciences, linguistics, cultural and religious stud-
ies. The refined result (447 hits) was subject to further selection based on abstracts
to identify 90 articles that focused on the demography of public sector organiza-
tions, excluding groups (regimes, coalitions, teams) and firms (profit-oriented
organizations). We have conducted another search round on ‘agenc*’ and
‘termin*‘or ‘surviv*‘or ‘death’, but found only a handful new articles of interests
because most overlapped.
Second, we searched the references of our selected results for additional
relevant articles. This resulted in another set of 18 articles that we looked into.
Our aim was to arrive at a comprehensive set of factors influencing the survival or
termination of organizations in the public sector. We therefore further excluded
articles that focused on non-state organizations, such as NGO’s, voluntary asso-
ciations, community-based organizations, non-profit agencies, interest groups,
foundations, and other similar types of organizations. Also, for the sake of
comparability we decided to focus on central government apparatuses and exclud-
ed studies on decentral (branches of) public organizations. Studies on central
government cabinet departments were not included because such studies seem to
address issues of portfolio allocation rather than administrative survival (Cf.
Mortensen and Green-Pedersen 2015; Glor 2011). To check whether we applied
our exclusion criteria well, we looked into the content of the articles to decide
whether it should be part of the review set. The final set comprised of twelve
articles published since 2000.
The review set was then studied in more detail to find contributions to our main
research question: why do some public organizations die whereas others survive
under similar circumstances? The results did not allow for a full systematic review
or meta-analysis that are more common in health, education and criminology
studies. Our approach could perhaps best be labeled a ‘scoping study’: a type of
structured literature review that allows for different study designs and non-
compatible results to be included (Arksey and O'Malley 2005). Scoping studies
follow systematic steps in reviewing available literature, while maintaining toler-
ance for variation of the included approaches, because the ultimate aim is to map
existing findings and gaps in the literature on a specified topic, in this case:
organizational survival.
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Termination Terminology
The Idea of Termination
What constitutes survival and termination of public organizations, really? Existing
studies clearly disagree. In the field of business administration there seems to be less
discussion on this matter. BSurvival of a private sector agency is a relatively identifiable
piece of data. The organization is either in business or it is not. Even in the private
sector, however, mergers, takeovers and splits make survival more than a simply
mechanical exercise^ (Peters and Hogwood 1991: 88–89).
When Kaufman initiated the debate on the mortality of government organizations
forty years ago, he casted his discussion in biological terms, i.e. the ‘mortality’, ‘life’
and ‘death’ of public organizations. In business administration studies, this biological
metaphor is commonly used. The ‘population ecology’ approach adopted the entire
idea that organizations that compete with the same product or service (be it newspapers,
shoe factories, restaurants) in a given area are a ‘species’ (Hannan and Freeman 1977).
Population ecology studies on the private sector borrowed concepts from biology to
explain firm mortality and organizational founding, as well as population growth and
change. According to Gray and Lowery (2000: 58), population ecologists do not so
much claim to equate organizations with organisms though, because they are inattentive
to individual traits of organizations other than their status of being ‘alive’ or ‘dead’.
Population ecologists only look at how populations (large numbers) of organizations
interact with each other and with their environment. This idea has since been applied
increasingly on populations of public sector organizations as well.
Population ecology thus requires a strict, dichotomous definition of what constitutes
survival. Yet defining termination for public organizations is an entirely different
matter, surrounded with ambiguity. Being ‘dead’ or ‘alive’ in bureaucracy is not a
dichotomy. Theoretically, the study of organizational termination used to be a subfield
of the policy termination and policy cycle literature (DeLeon 1982). These literatures
claim that the policies carried out by public organizations do not often come to a
definite end (Adam et al. 2007). In fact, public organizations and the policy programs
they implement seem to be subject to constant structural reform, which blurs the
distinction between termination or continuation in a dressed up (or down) version.
BWhen imagined as a binary choice, these details are lost^ (Bertelli and Sinclair 2016:
6). In fact, Breorganization is an ongoing pastime for politicians and managers in
government^ (Peters and Hogwood 1991: 89).
This reorganizing capacity of political executives is what makes public administration
and business administration such different fields. The difference between public and private
organizations is not about lack of competition for allegedly ‘monopolized’ public organi-
zations. Competition in the public sector is fierce, since the total budget is limited and a
wide variety of species wants a piece of the same cake. Yet, public organizations do not
only perish because rival organizations did a better job in securing essential resources.
Public organizations can also be deliberately axed or denied funding by a political
executive for ideological or electoral reasons. This difference matters for both termination
definitions and their implications. In the study of the survival of public organizations,
different perspectives on politics and administration have driven a wedge between existing
studies leading to a considerable fragmentation of insights.
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Two Perspectives: Political Control and Institutional Legacy
Government organizations are supposed to submit to political control. The polit-
ical control perspective therefore implies that structural changes to public organi-
zations are first and foremost political acts. Each political act deserves similar
attention, ranging from subtle name changes of organizations to fully fledged
abolitions. The contrasting approach, we call it institutional legacy, implies that
changes in the structure of government are best explained by the fact that public
organizations have their own interests (probably continuation, according to Downs
1967). The public organization adapts to its environment and sees political
interventions as a necessary evil that becomes part of the legacy to be carried
into its future.
Studies on public organization survival have thus sprung from two different
perspectives and two contrasting research approaches can be discerned. Either the
observer –from a political science background presumably – has an interest in
studying political control over the structure of government, from the perspective
of the principal. Or the organizations themselves take center stage and the study –
from a public administration or sociological institutional background – focuses on
what organizations do to strike root, survive and prosper. The latter looks into
explanations of the rise and demise of particular organizations from an institu-
tional legacy approach.
The Political Control Approach
The political control approach tends to define most change events (i.e., political
interventions) as termination and (re-) creation. While these changes reflect what
really happens to these public organizations, their status, functions and form,
above all they signal important political acts representing political control over
the public sector. To indicate the subtle variety, one can discern between different
‘termination types’, such as termination by change of form, termination by merger
or termination by acquisition of activity (James et al. 2015). It is important that no
changes go by unnoticed because ignoring name changes and other events such as
change of superior organization may mask important discontinuities.
Critics may argue that the least pervasive event (name change) does not really
reflect termination. But from the above perspective it does reflect a significant act
of political control over the organization. For instance, when the Dutch govern-
ment decided to name the ‘Luchtverkeersbeveiliging’ (Air Traffic Security) from
1998 onwards the ‘Lucht Verkeersleiding Nederland’ (LVNL, Air Traffic Control
Netherlands). This name change signals an outward and transboundary approach
to air traffic control. ATC has long been a domestic issue, but increasingly became
a joint European and global responsibility—an evolution reflected in its name
change. Though the agency continues as an organization this event can be
interpreted as a termination of its previous form, and a start of a ‘new’ phase in
a new form. Such cases represent a discontinuation of ‘key structural features’.
From a political control perspective such a discontinuation or structural change
justifies to be identified as an ‘event’, implying some form of termination (Hajnal
2012: 98; Cf. Greasley and Hanretty 2014).
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The Institutional Legacy Approach
The institutional legacy approach would advocate a more dichotomous definition of
termination instead of the subtle variety above. Organizations are only terminated if
they are disbanded, when they cease to exist in any form—period. All other events in
the life of a public organization are forms of adaptation, perhaps even on its own
initiative, in its struggle to survive (see also Dommett and Skelcher 2014, for an
account of agency responses when facing abolition and reform). In an impressive
historical institutionalist account of the life and death of the Australian Wheat
Board—later AWB Ltd.—, Botterill (2011: 637) shows the evolution from Ba venerable
institution, anchored in collective agrarian values^, to an Binternational grain trader
prepared to sell wheat whatever it took^—until the Oil for Food scandal unmasked its
institutional drift and caused its final death blow. Institutionalists in Selznick’s tradition
(1957: 17) focus on how public organizations got ‘infused with value’ from the
moment of its inception and how the legacy that the organization built over time
became the seeds of its eventual demise. The political control approach above would
instead dissect the life of the AWB in different durations for ‘different’ organizations,
whereas students of institutional legacy emphasize the integrity of the institution,
adapting over time.
Research Designs and Termination Definitions
The focus on institutional legacy lends itself better for comparative case studies
than for large N studies on populations. Case studies allow for a definition of
termination that depends largely on the judgment of the researcher. The researcher
builds an argument and in turn provides the reader with ample substance on each
case to validate the argumentation. Such an approach would also suit Kaufman’s
definition based on ‘uninterruptedly maintained organizational boundaries’ (1976:
28) or Starbuck and Nystrom’s (1981, xiv) identification of ‘significantly different
responsibilities’, or ‘substantial reorganization’. The larger the N, the more dis-
tance from the cases, the harder it becomes to make such substantiated judgments.
Yet even among the large N studies, one can discern approaches that take the
organization and its institutional legacy as vantage point (Peters and Hogwood
1988, 1991; Rolland and Roness 2011; MacCarthaigh 2014). They discern ‘main-
tenance’, ‘succession’ or organizational change categories as a go-between life
and death. Succession could be linear, non-linear, partial, complex and/or it could
involve mergers or splits (Peters and Hogwood 1988: 23–24). Rolland and Roness
(2011) and MacCarthaigh (2014) introduce subcategories discerning the dominant
partner in the merger or the dominant offspring that represents the continuation
after the split. These studies use comparable definitions, but they do not explain
events. Their distinction between terminating events and maintenance events does,
for example, not allow regression analysis and event history modeling to generate
statistically robust explanations.
The political control approach works best for large N statistical regressions. Studies
within this realm seek statistical explanations of survival. Peering from the principal
end of the discussion, authors look at organizational change as an act of political
intervention. In order to find out which political factors influence survival, they employ
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event-history analysis to explain ‘termination’ events (cf. Box-Steffensmeier and Jones
2004). There is no room for categories between life and death here, so most changes in
the organizational structure are considered a termination event. Bertelli and Sinclair
(2016) offer a way out by discerning both the fully abolished cases, the reformed ones
and the retained ones in different regression models. O’Leary (2015) also uses logistic
regression to explain termination of public organizations but only considers fully
abolished ones as terminated.
It is rather unfortunate that even studies that do statistically investigate the
factors that affect survival, employ different definitions. Their findings have a
different base and as such they do not add up in a meta-analysis. Park (2013)
follows Carroll and Delacroix (1982: 170) in that she only considers after a
merger Bthe resulting organization as new and the two merger partners as dead^.
She adopts a termination definition that includes merging and splitting, plus
shifting to the private sector, in line with Boin et al. (2010). The latter also treat
organizational survival dichotomously (no in-betweens), but did not encounter
mergers and splits (perhaps due to their specific population of New Deal organi-
zations). To Lewis (2002) an organization is dead as the result of a combination of
name change, change of proximity to the president and change of function of the
organization, which leads to more terminations than the abolishment/merger/split
definition. To Boin et al., the organizational structure and leadership would have
to be changed, too, before the organization was considered terminated (2010: 6–
7). These studies do seem to come close in their definition of events.
By contrast, Greasley and Hanretty (2014: 11–12) emphasize that Bto abolish,
merge, rename and otherwise signals a discontinuity in an organization’s life…^. They
also see reorganizations and name changes as terminations. Of their sample, 58% gets
terminated in a 23-year period. James et al. (2015) consider an organization not
terminated when its name changes but when its Bgovernance structure (of defined roles
for managers formally leading an organization and associated accountability mecha-
nisms) has been ended^ (p. 8). The James et al. (2015) definition deviates so much from
other definitions used, that it is impossible to say what implications it has for the
comparability of the termination rate. The number of terminations in their study is so
high though (109 of 153 organizations in 23 years, which adds up to 71%) that it might
indicate a bias in favor of discontinuation. As Park (2013: 416) concluded, Bthe
distinction between termination and change remains a matter of pragmatic choice rather
than strict theoretical underpinnings^ (see also Hajnal 2012). Again, much is left to the
judgment of the researcher.1
On an interpretative continuum varying from biasing in favor of stability versus
discontinuity of organization, the definitions of the studies discussed would rank as
follows (Fig. 1):
1 An additional study that has been included in this review, by Götz et al. (2015) did not specify its definition
of termination clearly enough for reference in this discussion. Because this study compares snapshots of
organizational populations over time, we assume that name changes, mergers and secessions imply termina-
tions (after all, these units disappear from the first snapshot and/or newly appear on the next).
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What we see is that most studies that focus on organizational characteristics as a
theoretical explanation for survival, also tend to use termination definitions that imply
more stability. Those studies that see political control as the main explanans for
survival, focus on organizational discontinuity.
When we keep in mind the different definitions of termination, we are better
equipped to appreciate the results of the subsequent analyses of different studies.
Presumably, the institutional legacy definitions lead to less terminations and higher
survival rates. In the next section, we distill from the literature the most important
factors and findings, discussing them one by one and we present per independent
variable the prevailing knowledge to construct a model of organizational survival.
A Model of Organizational Survival in the Public Sector
Though the definition of organizational termination varies per study, in this
section we treat the definition as if it were ‘constant’ across all twelve studies.
On the basis of an assessment of the findings in the existing literature we build a
theoretical model of determinants of organizational survival as if termination is
conceptualized in a similar way. This exercise provides us with an overview of
common findings and disagreements in existing research. The section first intro-
duces the hypotheses and ends with a summary of findings.
We have discerned: 1) demographic type explanations centering around the age of
the organization; 2) design type explanations focusing on ‘birth characteristics’ of
organizations that will have implications for future survival chances; and 3) contextual
or functional explanations, affecting the population in total or organizations with a
particular degree of specialization or niche, to elucidate why some survive changes in
their environment as opposed to others.
First, and perhaps the most prominent and oldest factor of interest to students of
organizational survival is the age of the organization as a factor in itself. Conven-
tional wisdom suggests that organizations tend to survive infinitely after they
reached maturity. The classic reference here is from Downs: Bthe older a bureau
is, the less likely it is to die^ (1967: 20). Lowi (1979: 309) explained: ‘once an
agency is established, its resources favor its own survival, and the longer agencies
survive, the more likely they are to continue to survive’.
Organizational theorists demonstrated however, that an organization’s survival
chances do not increase with age in a linear fashion. Stinchcombe (1965) intro-
duced the idea of a ‘liability of newness’, when new organizations have not been
Definitions of organizational termination used, on a stability – discontinuity continuum  
Termination definition focused on organizational stability
Termination definition focused on organizational discontinuity
Author(s) MacCarthaigh Boin et al Park O’Leary Bertelli/ 
Sinclair
Lewis Carpenter
/Lewis
Lewis Götz/
Grotz/
Weber
Hajnal Greasley
/Hanretty
James et al
Year 2014 2010 2013 2015 2016 2002 2004 2004 2015 2012 2014 2015
Explanans Rationalization 
of government
Insulation 
from 
politics
Organizational 
characteristics, 
Political 
turnover,
Economic 
growth
Organizational 
characteristics, 
Political 
turnover
Political 
turnover, 
transparency, 
account-
ability
Insulation 
from 
politics
Learning 
(time) 
about org. 
performanc
e by 
Congress
Power 
balance in 
Congress 
and 
deviation 
from the 
mean
Political 
ideology, 
socio-
economic 
pressure, 
institutional 
constraints
Insulati
on 
from 
politics
Political 
credibility
Agency 
performance
Fig. 1 Organizational termination on a continuum
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able to nest themselves sufficiently in their environment, when routines are not
well established and political volatility or growing pains may be fatal to the
newborn organization. By contrast, some scholars (Baum 1989) have argued,
organizations may also grow old and become obsolete (a ‘liability of obsoles-
cence’) when their functionality cannot keep up with changes in their environment
(think of a steamboat inspection service, or a firm such as Kodak) or when their
mission has been accomplished (a Western organization fighting leprosy or polio).
When both arguments hold, one would expect the survival chances of an organi-
zation to resemble an inverted U-curve.
Another demographic liability involves the dangers of adolescence (Bruderl and
Schussler 1990). Considering that legitimacy of the public organization abounds at
the moment of creation, i.e. that its legislative support base has just been
established and its proponents are still in office, the infant has a few years to
develop unharmed. After more than a decade, the organization can be considered
to have secured its resources and support base well enough to fend of competitors
and opponents. However, in the period right after its ‘honeymoon’ and before it
has taken firm root, the organization’s hazards rise because the protective shield of
its creators may have diminished and it may have become politically opportune for
its opponents to attack the organization or its policy. In this same period of
adolescence, legislative actors have had time to learn about the organization and
its accomplishments or performance (Carpenter and Lewis 2004). This learning
may result in the increased likelihood of fatal critique and termination.
Summing up, the text box below presents the most prominent age-hypotheses
that we detracted from the prevailing literature. We chose to hypothesize each age
effect separately in order to separate their estimated effects in order to give a better
overview of those age effects confirmed in the literature (see Table 1).
H1 A public organization faces higher hazards in the first five years after
creation (liability of newness). After five years the survival chances of public
organizations increase and become stable.
H2 A public organization faces higher hazards in its ‘adolescent’ years (>5 < 10).
The organization is imbued with immunity against termination by its creator(s) in
its first years and once it has overcome the hazards of adolescence its survival
chances increase and become stable.
H3 A public organization faces higher termination hazards when it has reached a
mature age (>30).
Second, the survival of public organizations can be explained by looking at the
‘birth characteristics’ or organizational ‘dna’. Some organizations are simply
stronger in their set up or have better armor for survival. This theory prevails
especially within the fields of political science, where organizations are seen as
embodiments of political interests and the acts of organizational creation and
termination are intrinsically linked to legislative-executive decision-making.
Though public organizations do often have a clientele, and a support base, there
is no market mechanism or invisible hand to take them out operation. Instead
opponents are sometimes highly visible, and their ‘attacks’ are predictable in such
a way that creators try to ‘hardwire’ their organizational offspring into survival.
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Here, we look into the effects of such design. The work of Moe (1989) inspired
Lewis (2002, 2004) and Boin et al. (2010) to study the effects of design on
populations of federal US government organizations. From their studies we de-
rived the following hypotheses:
H4 Organizations established by formal law have higher chances of survival
than organizations established by decree.
H5 Organizations set up at arm’s length of government have higher chances of
survival than organizations that operate in the hierarchy of a ministerial depart-
ment or executive office.
Though perhaps less a matter of intentional hard wiring, populations of firms can
feel the effects of organizational structure. Moore and Kraatz (2011) compared the
performance (with implications for survival) of 4000 Savings and Loans organizations
in the US. In the long run, the mutualities (80% of the population) fared better and took
less (unjustified) risk than the stock organizations (20%). The board structure and not-
for profit legacy of the mutualities prevented them from the audacity that became
detrimental over time to many of the stocks. In similar vein, Lewis (2002) and Boin
et al. (2010) looked at characteristics such as board structure (vs single administrators)
or political appointments of government organizations to see if those characteristics in
fact increased termination hazards.
H6 Organizations governed by a board have higher chances of survival than
organizations governed by a single administrator.
An increasing number of studies from the United Kingdom, focusing on the
termination of public agencies, have included the agency ‘type’ as a factor of influence
(O’Leary 2015; Bertelli and Sinclair 2016). Other studies mention the ‘regulatory
function’ of an organization as particularly important (Lewis 2002, 2004; James et al.
2015). We have included both types here, in distinct hypotheses, because the assumed
direction of influence on survival is different.
H7 Advisory organizations have lower chances of survival than other types of
public organizations.
H8 Regulatory organizations are more likely to survive than other types of public
organizations.
Lewis (2002, 2004) asserts that some organizations are set up temporarily from the
start. Their creation involves a ‘sunset clause’ that determines when the organization
will be dismantled (Cf. Boin et al. 2010).
H9 When organization are created with a sunset clause, they are unlikely to
survive that clause and mature into ‘old age’ (>average).
Third, existing research on survival in the public sector does take into account how
the odds of termination are affected by political and economic indicators (Lewis 2002,
2004; Boin et al. 2010; Park 2013; James et al. 2015). These studies hypothesize that a
conservative political climate leads to slimming the public sector, and that turnover in
general is likely to affect survival of organizations in a negative way because incoming
elects will probably attack the creations of their predecessors. Economic indicators
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serve as an important control: when government revenues go down, survival rates go
down as well (Carpenter and Lewis 2004). Others assert the opposite: recession makes
dismantling government organizations unlikely because it will increase unemployment
(Greasley and Hanretty 2014).
H10 Political turnover negatively affects survival of public organizations.
H11 A right wing (majority in) government negatively affects survival of public
organizations.
H12 Incumbency of a political executive of another political color than the
organization’s creator (so-called ‘unfriendly government’) negatively affects sur-
vival of public organizations.
H13 When total government revenues decrease, the likelihood of survival of public
organizations decreases as well.
In the next section we will discuss the actual influence of these factors on the
survival of public organizations, resulting from the studies reviewed here.
Discussion of Findings
So far, we have resisted the temptation to reveal how these factors fared in empirical
analyses on the public sector. In the overview below we present the findings from the
studies we reviewed in this paper and for each of the hypotheses above we give the
outcomes per study. Positive relation to survival is indicated by a ‘+’, a negative effect
on survival by a ‘–‘. So a ‘+’ for newness does not mean that the liability of newness is
confirmed, but that newness has a positive effect on survival. A tested but inconse-
quential factor is indicated by an ‘x’ and the ‘U’ stands for non-linear effects (for
instance insulation from presidential interference is a liability in the first six years of an
organization’s lifespan but protects it in the long run, see Boin et al. 2010).
We see in this overview, that on average more than 50 % of the public organizations
perish during the period studied. By no means does the myth of immortality hold up.
Because the time periods of the studies differ, it is important to annualize the results.
The comparably high percentages of 75% (Boin et al. 2010) and 72% (James et al.
2015) turn out to reflect quite different termination rates when divided by the number of
years over which terminations took place.
When significant, nine factors seem to have a unidirectional confirmed effect on
survival. Old age makes organizations more likely to survive (H3), and so does a
regulatory function (H8), and a firm legislative base (H4). Adolescence (H2) is a hazard
in two studies, but for different reasons and under different conditions. Advisory
organizations (H7) are less likely to survive and, not surprisingly, so are organizations
set up with a sunset clause (H9). In general, political turnover has a negative effect on
survival of public organizations, i.e. new incumbents start reorganizing the administra-
tion (H10). Unfriendly incumbencies (i.e. political executives of a different political
ideology – H12) are likely to target the organizational creations of their political
opponents previously in office. If the color of the incumbency matters, it is because
rightwing incumbencies (H11) have a negative effect on survival.
In two studies the ideology of the incumbent government interacts with other
factors. Götz et al. (2015) show that leftwing governments are less inclined to
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terminate public organizations than rightwing governments, unless budgetary
pressure increases (factors 11 and 13). Similarly, Greasley and Hanretty (2014)
conclude that public organizations face higher hazards operating under rightwing
governments in ‘normal’ times (low to moderately high budget pressure). But
when debt increases, organizations operating under a left-wing government face
higher termination risks. Greasley and Hanretty add another factor though: Bthe
effect of greater-than-average debt on agency termination is negative for very
young agencies, and for older agencies, but positive for agencies in their third to
seventh years^ (p. 17). So leftwing executives under budgetary pressure are
inclined to target adolescent public organizations for termination (in line with
our hypothesis 2).
On the other factors, contradictory evidence exists. Carpenter and Lewis (2004)
contradict conventional wisdom that budgetary pressure negatively affects survival
(H13). In their study, the effect is the opposite (and robust in three different
models): budgetary surpluses increase the hazards, and deficits make terminations
less likely. Due to the short term cost of organizational termination, such decisions
would be unfavorable in times of fiscal constraints and budgetary austerity
(Carpenter and Lewis 2004: 222). Park (2013) tested this claim but found no
significant effects.
In Lewis’s 2002 and 2004 studies, insulation from executive interference (arm’s
length status – H5) makes organizations fare better than those created in proximity to
the executive but this is contradicted by other research (Boin et al. 2010; Hajnal 2012).
Newness of the organization is an asset according to some and a liability according to
others (H1).
An updated model would predict that regulatory public organizations created by law
and existing for at least 12 years are the most termination-proof, but by no means
hazard-free. Newly created or adolescent advisory organizations created by executive
order are much less likely to survive. In general, hazards increase when political winds
change. New incumbents tend to weed the administration upon entry into the executive
office targeting the showcases of their political opponents but also reforming the
administration set up by predecessors of the same ideology. Rightwing executives are
particularly likely to terminate public organizations and leftwing governments become
likely to do so under budgetary pressure.
The recent studies on survival and termination of public organizations have done
much to debunk old myths. Downs (1967), Kaufman (1976) and Lowi (1979) were
proven wrong on their assumptions of near-immortality of bureaucracy. Stinchcombe’s
liability of newness (1965) does not always hold up either. Time to move on to new
hypotheses in the future. The next section will discuss some promising avenues for
further research.
Reflections on the Way ahead
This paper has provided an overview of factors that could explain survival of
public organizations and evaluated the main hypotheses from the literature by
comparing the results. To improve the future debate on organizational survival in
the public sector and build on existing research, we propose to replace the binary
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definition of organizational termination with a focus on ‘transitions’. Termination
implies a definite ‘end’ that may apply to a period in which an organization took
on a particular form, while the organization itself does not end. We prefer to use
the more neutral term ‘transitions’ to refer to the events through which organiza-
tions move from one status to another. Transitions could be studied as dependent
variables in their own right. Together, many transitions of individual governmental
units could result in a transformation of government.
Transitions include all the structural changes to the organization that can be
measured consistently and reliably over time, such as name changes, change of
superior organization, change of hierarchical level, change from staff to line unit,
changes in structural autonomy by law, as well as mergers, splits and abolish-
ments. This more fine-grained approach allows building both on existing datasets
and on studies that have a dichotomous or biological take on survival. When
detailed transitions are coded as events, data can still be made compatible to
studies focusing on institutional legacy—by systematically ignoring the subtle
transitions such as name changes or changes of level in the bureaucratic hierarchy
and focusing on the more definite passings only such as full abolishments or
mergers. Meanwhile coding all transitions as events affords employing event
history modeling for multivariate regression analyses and explain what affects
survival in the public sector. At the same time it affords studying the transforma-
tions of the state in a variety of ways.
Coding transition events allows to identify transformations of individual organiza-
tions. Sequential transitions that we include in a single analysis as forms of ‘termina-
tion’ could turn out to be a clever organizational adaptation to changing resource levels
that ultimately save the organization from abolishment. Alternatively, Levine et al.
(1981) teach us that more subtle transitions could also represent staged responses to
fiscal stress (ignoring changing resource levels by issuing window-dressing reforms or
delaying tactics) that are ultimately the prelude of a more profound administrative
restructuring of individual organizations (Levine et al. 1981). Future studies on orga-
nizational termination should probe into this.
The current studies on survival of public organizations mainly focus on
independent agencies, in majoritarian political systems. Rich harvest is waiting
in the study of reform of both public agencies and national ministries in
continental Europe. Such populations would allow for systemic comparisons
between majoritarian and consensual systems but also afford studying the
effect of policy preferences of different parties in coalition governments, on
administrative reform and organizational termination. It could build forward on
findings of Götz et al. (2015) and Greasley and Hanretty (2014) that political
ideology has different effects under different circumstances or for different
organizations. In addition, such future research could look into the link between
policy preferences (the Manifestos data on electoral programs) or policy agendas
(the Comparative Agendas project) and organizational reforms within specific
policy domains.
We know now that public organizations perish. We also know that organizational
design can help to protect organizations against termination hazards. Time has come to
probe deeper into how the structure of government relates to specific political power
plays and particular policy preferences.
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